Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Pages: 616
•
Trim: 7 x 10¼
978-0-7425-4039-2 • Paperback • November 2005 • $87.00 • (£67.00)
Roger Z. George has recently joined the Sherman Kent Center, part of the CIA University's Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. He completed a 3-year teaching assignment at the National War College, where he served as the DCI's Faculty Representative from 2001-2004. Dr. George has been a career intelligence analyst at CIA for 25 years and is a member of the Senior Analytic Service (SAS). He has also served as a Policy Planning Staff member in the Department of State from 1989-91, was the National Intelligence Officer for Europe from 1991-1995, and was the Director of the Policy and Analysis Group for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, from 1995-1997. Dr. George received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Occidental College in 1971 and his Ph.D in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1977. He has taught International Politics at Brandeis University, Occidental College, UC Santa Cruz and was a post-doctoral research fellow at Stanford University prior to government service. Robert D. Kline is currently working as an independent consultant after recently retiring from the U.S. Department of Defense, where he served for more than 25 years as a senior executive. He was on the faculty of the National Defense University from 2000-2003, and taught in the Department of National Security Strategy at the National War College. Prior to serving at the Department of Defense, Mr. Kline was a senior analyst at the U.S. General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, where he also served on the staff of a Member of Congress. Mr. Kline is a native of Washington, D.C. His undergraduate work was in Political Science and History at the University of Maryland, College Park, and he holds graduate degrees from both the University of Maryland and Johns Hopkins University. He is also a graduate of the Federal Executive Institute.
Chapter 1 Foreword
Chapter 2 Introduction: Teaching Intelligence
Part 3 I Intelligence and the Strategist
Chapter 4 1 Clausewitz on Intelligence
Chapter 5 2 Clausewitz's Contempt for Intelligence
Part 6 II Origins and Future of U.S. Intelligence
Chapter 7 3 Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency: "Those Spooky Boys"
Chapter 8 4 Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution
Chapter 9 5 The Need to Reorganize the Intelligence Community
Part 10 III Intelligence and Democracy
Chapter 11 6 Balancing Liberty and Security
Chapter 12 7 Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence
Chapter 13 8 Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight
Chapter 14 9 The Role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in National Security
Part 15 IV Challenges of Technical Collection
Chapter 16 10 Space-Based Surveillance: Reconnaissance Satellites Are a National Security Sine Qua Non
Chapter 17 11 Unclassified Space Eyes
Chapter 18 12 Commercial Satellite Imagery Comes of Age
Chapter 19 13 "John, How Should We Explain MASINT?"
Chapter 20 14 The Time of Troubles: The U.S. National Security Agency in the 21st Century
Part 21 V The Art of Clandestine Collection
Chapter 22 15 The In-Culture of the DO
Chapter 23 16 Espionage in an Age of Change: Optimizing Strategic Intelligence Services for the Future
Chapter 24 17 Economic Espionage
Chapter 25 18 The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence
Chapter 26 19 A Review of the FBI's Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activites of Aldrich Hazen Ames
Part 27 VI The Open-Source Revolution
Chapter 28 20 Open-Source Intelligence: New Myths, New Realities
Chapter 29 21 The Strategic Use of Open-Source Information
Chapter 30 22 Open-Source Intelligence: A Review Essay
Part 31 VII Challenges of Intelligence Analysis
Chapter 32 23 Defining the Analytic Mission: Facts, Findings, Forecasts, and Fortunetelling
Chapter 33 24 The Challenge for the Political Analyst
Chapter 34 25 Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mindsets: Alternative Analysis
Chapter 35 26 The Intelligence Community Case Method Program: A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia
Chapter 36 27 Building Leverage in the Long War: Ensuring Intelligence Community Creativity in the Fight Against Terrorism
Part 37 VIII Deception, Denial, and Disclosure Problems
Chapter 38 28 Intelligence and Deception
Chapter 39 29 Miscalculation, Surprise, and U.S. Intelligence
Chapter 40 30 How Leaks of Classified Intelligence Help U.S. Adversaries: Implications for Laws and Secrecy
Part 41 IX Perils of Policy Support
Chapter 42 31 What to Do When Traditional Models Fail
Chapter 43 32 What We Should Demand from Intelligence
Chapter 44 33 American Presidents and Their Intelligence Communities
Chapter 45 34 Inside the White House Situation Room
Part 46 X Intelligence and the Military
Chapter 47 35 The DCI and the Eight-Hundred-Pound Gorilla
Chapter 48 36 Tug of War: The CIA's Uneasy Relationship with the Military
Chapter 49 37 CIA Support to Enduring Freedom
Chapter 50 38 Working with the CIA
Chapter 51 39 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Forces: Covert Warriors
Chapter 52 Appendix A The National Security Act: Excerpts
Chapter 53 Appendix B Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activites
Chapter 54 Appendix C Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1
Chapter 55 Appendix D The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch
An extraordinarily rich collection, covering almost every topic likely to be featured in any college, graduate, or professional school course concerning intelligence.
— Ernest May, Harvard University
The anthology provides an excellent baseline for educating any analyst or consumer, new or experienced, on many of the issues consistently at play within the intelligence community. Providing content and context to the issues of requirements, collection, exploitation, analysis, and consumer use, the book provides an excellent foundation for understanding the challenges inherent in each part of the intelligence cycle. It is ideal for its intended use as a textbook for future analysts and policy makers, and is equally suited for anyone interested in how the intelligence community and its components operate.
— Naval War College Review