Why do leaders make foreign policy decisions that often appear irrational or engage in major reversals of previous policy to the extent that observers wonder at their intentions? How are leaders in the Global South (GS), the majority of which should lack much influence in international politics, sometimes are able to defy external pressure or even get powerful states to do their bidding? While some analysts focus on domestic politics or on external factors to explain shifts in foreign policy, the GS decision model emphasizes that observers forgo useful insights in applying these categories to occurrences that are in fact transnational—when the domestic and foreign cannot be disentangled. Drawing on the poliheuristic decision making model, which makes political survival paramount, Andrea K. Grove argues that leaders weigh political considerations and eliminate options that do not fit with the most pressing concerns for these leaders: legitimacy and regime security. Application of this model to the cases of Uganda, Kenya, Qatar, and Turkey not only improves understanding of foreign policy pathways but reveals ways in which leaders of developing states can manipulate their tough environments to serve their interests. They can sometimes exploit more powerful countries to raise their state’s profile beyond what is warranted by objective measures.